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(62 C.1d 239, U Cal.Rptr. 107. 398 P.2d 1t7] 
L. A. No. 27435. In Bank. Jan. 19, 1965.] 
MICHAEL B. MUGGILL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE 
REUBEN H. DONNELLEY CORPORATION, Defend-
ant and Respondent. 
[1] ProC6ss-Service by Publication-Nonresidents.-Serviee of 
summons by publication (Code Civ. Proe., §§ 412, 413) on non-
residents and a foreign corporation does not give the eourt 
personal jurisdiction over them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 417.) 
[2] Parties-Indispensable Parties.-In an action for declaratory 
relief to establish the right to reinstatement in the employees' 
retirement plan of defendant corporation, neither the tmstee, 
a foreign corporation disbursing the retirement funds, nor the 
members of the retirement committee administering the plan 
were indispensable parties; an effective judgment, ordering 
reinstatement nnder the plan and declaring unenforceable a 
provision of the plan to terminate payments to a beneficiary 
employed by a competitor of defendant eould be rendered 
against defendant alone. 
[3] Contracts-Legality-Contracts in Restraint of Trade.-Bus. 
& Prof. Code, § 16600, declaring void contracts that restrain 
anyone from engaging in a lawful trade or business, invali-
dates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an em-
ployee from working for a competitor after eompletion of his 
employment or imposmg a penalty if he does 80, unless such 
provisions are necessary to protect the employer's trade 
secrets. 
[t] Id.-Legality-Contraets in Restraint of Trade.-A provIsion 
of a corporate pension plan, which plan became part of the em-
ployment contract, that payments shall be suspended or termi-
nated in the event any retired employee enters any occupation 
or does any act which is in competition with any phase of the 
business of his former employer restrained the retired em-
ployee from engaging in a lawful business and was void nnder 
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16600, declaring contracts void that re-
strain anyone from engaging in a lawful trade or business. 
P (1] Bee Cal.Jur.2d, Process, Notices, and Papers, § 56; Am.Jur., 
rocess (1st ed §§$3-77). 
[2] Bee Cal.Jur.2d, Parties, § 4; Am.Jur., Parties (1st ed § 5) . 
... raj Bee Cal.Jur.2d, Monopolies, Combinations, and Restraints of 
.trade, § 5. 
CoJ4eX. Dig. References: [1] Process, § 33; [2] Parties, § 8; [3,4] 
ntracts, § 66. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of LoS 
Angeles County. Arthur Crum, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to determine plaintiff's right to reinstatement in a 
retirement plan. Judgment for defendant reversed. 
Eugene Kelly for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
O'Melveny & Myers, Maynard J. Toll, Philip F. Westbrook, .. 
Jr., and Richard E. Sllerwood for Defendant and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plainti1f appeals from an adverse judg-
ment in an action for declaratory relief . to establish his 
right to reinstatement in the employees' retirement plan of 
defendant corporation. 
Plainti1f left defendant's employ on JUly 1, 1960, after·· 
meeting all the requirements for benefits under the retirement 
plan. On October 24, 1960, he went to work for a competitor 
of defendant. On December 5, 1960, the retirement committee 
that administers the plan notified plainti1f that his rights to 
receive payments had been terminated pursuant to section 2 
. of article five of the plan on the ground that he had entered 
the employ of a competitor.1 Plaintiff then brought this 
action against the corporation, the members of the retirement 
committee, and the trustee that disburses the funds under 
the plan, seeking a declaration that he was entitled to rein-
statement on the ground that the section invoked by the re-
tirement committee was against public policy and unenforce-
able. The trial court held that it was valid. The court also 
held that the members of the retirement committee and the 
trustee were indispensable parties (see Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 389) over whom it had no jurisdiction. It therefore entered 
judgment for the defendant. 
[1] The trial court correctly concluded that it did not 
have personal jurisdiction over the members of the retire-
ment committee or over the trustee, a foreign corporation. 
They were not residents of this st{lte, and plainti1f's service 
of summons by publication (Code Civ. Proe., §§ 412,413) did 
not give the court personal jurisdiction over them. (Code 
Civ. Proc., §.417; see Atkinson v. Superior Oourt, 49 Ca1.2d 
IThe aeetion provides: "The Annuity payments to any retired Em· 
ployee shall be IUspended or terminated in the event such retired 
Employee at any time enters any occupation or does any act which. 
in the judgment of the Retirement Committee or of an Employer. u 
in competition with any phase of the buain_ of any Employer." 
) 
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338, 346 [316 P.2d 960].) Section 417 does not preclude 
securing personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation do-
ing business in this state by service of process pursuant to 
section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but since plaintiff 
did not serve the trustee pursuant to that section, we need 
not decide whether it was doing business in this state in acting 
as trustee of a pension plan covering California employees. 
[2] Plaintiff contends that the members of the committee 
and the trustee are not indis!lensable parties. "A person 
is an indispensable party to an _oon if his absence will pre-
vent the court from rendering any effective judgment be-
tween the parties or would seriously prejudice any party 
before the court or if his interest would be inequitably affected 
or jeopardized by a judgment rendered between the parties." 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 389.) Care must be taken to prevent this 
rule of fairness in procedure from imposing a "burdensome 
requirement which may thwart rather than accomplish jus-
tice." (Bank of California v. Superior Court, 16 Ca1.2d 
516, 521 [106 P.2d 879].) If we were to hold that the com-
mittee members and the trustee were indispensable parties, 
corporations could evade their obligations under retirement 
plans merely by naming nonresidents as members of the 
committee and as trustee. Indeed such a ruling would prevent 
plaintiff from obtaining relief in this case. 
Neither the trustee nor the committee members are in-
dispensable parties. An effective judgment ordering plaintiff's 
reinstatement under the plan and declaring section 2 of article 
five unenforceable can be rendered against thc corporati!>n 
alone 
The retirement committee need not be separately joined 
for an effective judgment. In suspending plaintiff the com-
mittee acted as an agent of the corporation, which holds the 
Ultimate authority. The committee members, appointed by 
the corporation, serve without compensation and at the pleas-
ure of the corporation. A judgment against the corporation 
effectively binds the committees that act on its behalf. Thus, 
in an action to compel the declaration of dividends, a judg-
ment against the corporation alone is effective, for the mem-
bers of the boar4 of directors are not indispensable parties. 
(Doherty v. Mutual Warehouse Co., 245 F.2d 609, 612; Kroesc 
v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 763-765 [15 
A.L.R.2d 1117], cert den. 339 U.S. 983 [70 8.Ct. 1026, 94 
L.Ed. 1386]; Whittemore v. Conf1'ncntal Mills, 98 F.Supp. 
387, 391 i contra, Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F.2d 952, 
) 
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957-958, cert. den. 833 U.S. 875 [68 S. Ct. 905, 92 L.Ed. 
1151].) Likewise, the president or secretary need not be. 
joined in an action against the corporation to compel the 
execution and delivery of a stock certificate. (Hertz v. Re-
cord Publishing Co., 219 F.2d 897, 400, cert. den. 349 U.S. 
912 [75 S.Ct. 601, 99 L.Ed. 1247] ; see Tregear v. Etiwanda 
Water Co., 76 Cal. 537 [18 P. 658, 9 Am.St.Rep. 245].) 
Moreover, the corporation and the committee have concurrent 
power to terminate payments under section 2 of article five 
and, presumably, would also have concurrent power to re-
instate. 
Similarly, the trustee need not be separately joined. Under 
the plan it merely disburses funds and does so "only at the 
time, in the amount, and in the manner directed in written 
directions received by the Trustee from the Retirement Com-
mittee." (Retirement Trust, article five.) A judgment affect-
ing corporate policy would determine what the trustee will be 
told, and it "may follow such instructions without question." 
(Retirement Trust, article five.) We cannot presume that it 
will refuse to do so. 
We therefore find no justification for holding that the trus-
tee or the committee members are indispensable parties. The 
corporation, as the party before the court, will not be preju-
diced by a judgment, since it has authority to control the 
actions of the nonparties. Their interests will not be inequita-
bly affected, because they have no personal interest at stake 
and can safely follow the judgment. Accordingly, we reach 
the merits. 
[3] With certain exceptions not relevant here, section 
16600 of the Business and Professions Code provides that 
"every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging 
in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to 
that extent void." This section invalidates provisions in em-
ployment contracts prohibiting an employee from working 
for a competitor after completion of his employment or impos-
ing a penalty if he does so (Chamberlain v. Augustine, 172 
Cal. 285, 288 [156 P. 479] ; Morris v. Harris, 127 Cal.App.2d 
476,478 [274 P.2d 22] ; Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co., 300 
F. 1, 4), unless they are necessary to protect the employer's 
trade secrets (Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal.2d 690, 694 [321 
P.2d 456]). [4] Since the pension plan becomes part of the 
contract of employment (see Bas v. United States Rubber Co., 
100 CaI.App.2d 565, 568 [224 P.2d 386]), such provisions 
Jan. 1965) MUGGILL tI. REUBEN H. DONNELLEY CORP. 243 
(82 C.M 139; 42 Cal.Rptr. 01. 898 P.2d 14?1 
therein are also invalid. Thus, in Chamberlain v. Augustine, 
supra, 172 Cal. 285, 288, which involved a sale of stock by a 
retiring employee, this court held invalid an agreement to pay 
liquidated damages to the purchasers if the employee worked 
for a competitor. The court reasoned that the agreement 
"imposes upon him a liability in the sum of five thousand 
dollars if he does engage in such business. If the contract is 
valid, he is not as free to do so as he would have been if he 
were not bound by it. To the extent that the necessity of pay-
ing five thousand dollars deters him from engaging therein, 
he would be restrained." Similarly, in this case, the provision 
forfeiting plaintiff's pension rights if he works for a competi-
tor restrains him from engaging in a lawful business and is 
. therefore void. In view of the settled interpretation of section 
16600, cases from other jurisdictions cited by defendant are 
not persuasive. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., 
concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for 
the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Ashburn in the opinion 
prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal (Muggill 
v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (Cal.App.) 39 Cal.Rptr. 753). 
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